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The purpose of this paper is to identify a function for some of the
graphics which may be found in Wittgenstein's writings. Not all the
graphics function in the same way, but so little has been written
about them that an outline of the function of even a few would seem
to make a useful contribution.
I describe the graphics in relation to seven key [lexical] concepts
taken from the co-text (criterion, symptom, calculation, proof,
explanation, description, paradigm). By adopting a content-model
for the interpretation of the graphics, and then comparing them to
the key lexical concepts it is concluded that graphics function
normatively in that they establish the underlying grammatical
structure of concepts such as proof. This gives them a more active
role in concept grammar than has been ascribed to them hitherto by
commentators such as Baker and Hacker. A link is also made
between the graphics and the important role of generality and
prototype (ungefähr and Urbild) in the formation of our concept-
frameworks.
Criterion and symptom
The concept of criteria developed gradually throughout
Wittgenstein's middle and later periods. For the purposes of this
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paper I am concerned only to give one reading of the term. Criteria
function normatively and are part of the grammatical rules of
application for a term. These rules are part of our form of
representation. Confusions between criteria and symptoms arise
when the form of representation is applicable and supportive of one
grammatical proposition, but not supportive of another which
appears to have the same structure. For example, first-person
assertions of sensations such as "I am in pain" are regarded by
Wittgenstein as a symptom of pain for the utterer, because of the
lack of criteria. The private language argument discusses why there
can be no criteria in this case. On the other hand, third-person
assertions such as "she is in pain" are made on the basis of observing
pain behaviour, that are regarded as one of many criteria of her pain
for us. Another criterion would be her avowal "I am in pain".
The first-person statement is an avowal with no means of sharing
the accompanying sensation. We therefore have no way of
ascertaining the sincerity of the utterer and thereby the truthfulness
of the avowal. Furthermore, it would be nonsense to assert "I
thought I was in pain but I was mistaken" because the person
making the avowal does not have [Cartesian] privileged access to
data which would ensure the consistent application of the term. The
avowal cannot therefore be a criterion for the utterer of whether she
has a pain. In the case of the third-person assertion, we take it as one
criterion of pain that certain behaviour determines the conditions
under which we can appropriately say "she is in pain". Manifest
behaviour accompanied by first-person avowals are usually our
main criteria of third-person pain. Thus there is an unexpected
asymmetry between the expressions "I am in pain" and "she is in
pain" (PI-I §§246-265).
Furthermore, "verifiability" does not offer a simple substitute for the
meaning of a proposition. Meaning is determined by the use of the
proposition in a framework of application (PI-I §353). Thus the
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meaning of "sameness of number" is not determined by a single act
of verifying (counting), but has several context-dependent criteria:
in I and II the number that one immediately recognizes; in III the
criterion of correlation; in IV we have to count both groups; in V we
recognize the same pattern. (PG p.354 ∆1258)1
Calculation and proof
The term "calculation" is applied by Wittgenstein to non-
mathematical concepts, but for the moment I will assume reference
to a mathematical calculation. Calculation is a particular operation
in which we draw correct inferences. Thus when we say 25x25=625
we calculate with numbers and when we say 25x25=605 we do not
calculate (RFM-VI §23). When we calculate we do not "discover"
something. "A calculation is not an experiment" (PI-II p.218). It is a
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criterion of calculation that we should accept the outcome as a
correct inference. What we take as a correct inference cannot
therefore be determined by calculation but by the nature of our
numerical practice. This appears to leave our numerical practice
open to considerable arbitrariness based on eccentricities of
implementation. However, the coherence of our numerical system
contributes to our notion of correct inference. Thus we can, and do,
say (24x25)+(1x25)≡25x25.
Our use of conventions is not arbitrary but discretionary, because
the fabric of our conventions is a closely woven one in which we
subscribe to many conventions when we subscribe to one. However,
at the outset it may be discretionary whether one convention or
another is applied. What is discretionary is the sense in which one
convention or form of representation may be exchanged for another
while remaining useful. Utility is probably a matter of compatibility.
The less exchange there is between systems the fewer are the
constraints over the form of representation.
What Wittgenstein attacks is the feeling that our grammar is
answerable to reality. 7+5 is an "alternative description" of 12 (Baker
& Hacker p.321). 7+5=12 flows from the meaning of these signs. In
another system, 7+5 might equal 13 but then 12 and 13 would mean
something different.
Correct inference is a criterion by which we test whether calculation
has occurred. Likewise proof, being related to calculation with
numbers or geometrical proof, is a certain kind of operation which
needs some context of practice:
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in the system α is it possible to trisect a line? What kind of trisection
is meant in this question… trisection by trial and error and
measurement? In that case the answer is perhaps yes.
(PG-II §27 ∆1261)
In addition we are given the graphical concept that "a proof is a
single pattern" (RFM-I §28) and "the proof serves as a picture of the
experiment" (RFM-I §36).
A rectangle can be made of two parallelograms and two triangles.
Proof:
(RFM-I §50 ∆1045)
That we take something as a proof is a grammatical move in our
game of calculating with numbers or in geometry. This brings us to
our third pair of words: explain and describe.
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Explanation and description
Contrary to our naïve expectations, when we think we are
explaining by means of the assertion of criteria, we are most
commonly simply describing what constitutes our practice. We take
a particular move in our language game as a proper application.
Our naïve expectation of the difference between description and
explanation is illustrated at the beginning of PI by the Augustinian
picture of language learning. Wittgenstein's target is not whether we
do in fact learn language by this means, i.e. that we learn words
which are names of objects defined by ostension and that operators
are learned in the context of speaking and action. What is in
question is that we commonly have a view that explaining how
language is acquired could be constituted by an account of this
kind. On the contrary, Wittgenstein asserts (PI-I §30) that this
simply describes our practice of responding to the question "how is
language learned?" One move in our response-game is description
by ostension. In the case of naming we take it as a criterion of
correct learning that an appropriate action is performed by the
learner in response to a gesture from the teacher. This is "having
learned the meaning of a word".
Paradigms and graphics
the picture of a black and white patch serve us simultaneously as a
paradigm of what we understand by "lighter" and "darker" and as a
paradigm for "white" and "black". (RFM-I §105 ∆1055)
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So what part do graphics play in this social construct? In particular,
given the considerable number of graphics, are they illustrations
which reveal our common misconception of an explanation as a
description, or a criterion as a symptom?
In response I shall introduce a seventh term from the quotation
above: paradigm. I shall use the term in the following way: that a
paradigmatic word or graphic shall (a) have a certain quality so that
when we compare it with something it is to that quality that we
attend, and (b) that this word or graphic has a role as part of an
accepted practice of general reference. Let me give an example: we
might take the colour of the British pillar-box as a paradigm of "red".
The pillar-box is normally red, and so meets criterion (a) by virtue of
its colour. It may be that in some place a pillar-box has been painted
a different colour and so although standardised it must be accepted
that the "redness" and not the "pillar-box form" is the quality to
which we draw attention. Of course, Wittgenstein discusses at some
length the object of reference in ostensive definition, i.e. whether we
can draw attention to the colour and not to the form with any
reliability (PI-I §§28 & 29).
Criterion (b) requires that although the pillar-box has the colour red
it does not become a paradigm of red until we use it in ostensive
descriptions. We point to the pillar box and say "this is pillar box
red". However, there may be atypical examples of pillar boxes that
are not red. So we cannot say that "pillar box red" is defined by any
pillar box. In fact there are colour samples which define British
Standard Colours, amongst which is (perhaps) "pillar box red". It is
reference to this sample rather than to a pillar box that defines the
colour.
Samples have a particular role. They provide a referent for a
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definition, e.g. the standard metre is the length of the so-called
"standard metre" in Paris. Thus if we ask whether something is one
metre in length we can/should compare it with the sample in Paris.
In such systems we must be confident that the canonical sample is
invariable. More particularly, it becomes meaningless to ask in this
case whether the canonical sample itself has a length of one metre.
Unlike samples, paradigms are not definitive, they are simply
characteristic, e.g. we can have a paradigm of red, being somewhere
in the middle of the range of hue and saturation to which we
normally apply this colour-word; whereas the canonical sample is
more specific, e.g. that this red sample is BS X-XXX. But herein lies
the utility of the paradigm. It may be used to demonstrate qualities
which cannot have definitive [canonical] samples. "This is one metre
in length" is a move in grammar equivalent to saying "I will take
this as a unit of measurement called one metre". It is a definition.
However, "this is a paradigm of  red" is part of a social transaction
about broad concept-frameworks for which a canonical sample
cannot be available.
We use a paradigm as an exemplar but not as a definition. This
introduces a certain generality to the content-model that is a feature
of concept like "red" but not of the concept "one metre in length".
The philosophical, rather than commonplace, problem of generality
finds expression in "the problem of the heap" (PG-I appendix 8) and
in everyday concepts such as "noticeably longer" (PG-I appendix 8,
∆1183). The problem only becomes a philosophical problem when
we seek specific boundaries to the transition from quantity a to
quantity b.
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In RFM-I, which is a re-ordering of the second part of an early
version of PI, Wittgenstein discusses a paradigm of counting and
calculating up to five in the form of "bracket notation" (RFM-I §67
∆1049):
This shows what we mean by addition. If we have this content-
model then we are able to correctly infer that 3+2=5. We can also
represent the commutativity of arithmetical operations, e.g.
27+16=43, 43-16=27, etc., and other internal relations by showing the
sum divided by a line which may be placed anywhere along our
total number (the representation in RFM-III §11 is less clear than the
corresponding entry in an unpublished manuscript MS 122 p.28r
reproduced here):
Commutation also applies to our understanding of spatial objects
which fit together, e.g. RFM-I §70 (∆1050):
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It is not the case that number-concepts are defined by graphics but
that these examples show the fundamentally graphical/practical
foundations of our mathematical concept-framework. They show
what we mean by correct inference, which is in turn bound up with
our concept of the continuity of physical objects.
This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down
three beans and then another three beans and then count what is
there. If the result at one time were 5, at another 7... then the first
thing we said would be that beans were no good for teaching sums. 
(RFM-I §37)
This comparison with practice is reinforced by Wittgenstein's
thought-experiment of the tribe who calculate the price of a heap of
wood by the area covered by the heap rather than the volume of
wood (RFM-I §149). In other words they ignore the height. We
would say they do not calculate consistently, but our concept of
accuracy is bound up with our concept of three-dimensionality and
value according to quantity. However, we do not always apply such
a framework of calculation to monetary value. For example, we
often calculate salaries not on the basis of quantity of work done
(e.g. wood stacked), but on the basis of hours consumed or the age
or sex of the worker.
So how does this generalised content-model of a paradigm affect
our interpretation of the graphics in relation to the text?
Appropriately chosen paradigms give us the opportunity of seeing
connections, of having perspicuous representations of our concepts.
Michael A.R. Biggs
11
Seeing connections is fundamental (PI-I §122). Unfortunately only
one graphical example of such a conceptual model is given, the
colour octahedron (Philosophical Remarks p.278 ∆1121). Even this is
described merely as adequate (genügt) rather than perspicuous
(übersichtlich):
To what extent can you say that grey is a mixture of black and white
in the same sense as orange is a mixture of red and yellow? And
doesn't lie between black and white in the sense in which red lies
between blue-red and orange? If we represent the colours by means
of a double-cone, instead of an octahedron, there is only one between
on the colour-circle, and red appears on it between blue-red and
orange in the same sense as that in which blue-red lies between blue
and red. And if in fact that is all there is to be said, then a
representation by means of a double-cone is adequate, or at least one
using a double eight-sided pyramid is.
The colour octahedron is thus a representation of the grammar of
our colour concepts. It represents our concept-grammar, rather than
being a phenomenalistic representation of colour. The octahedron
links our uses of colour concepts and words. It relates what we say,
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e.g. white is lighter than black, to the phenomena. Other colour
systems show other colour-concept relationships, e.g. that yellow is
brighter than green, which the octahedron does not. In particular
the octahedron shows relationships between four primary colours
which are no longer fundamental to our colour concepts because of
the influence of RGB or CMY colour theory. We might use this to
"prove" why "there is a geometrical gap, not a physical gap, between
red and green" (Z §354).
So why are graphics used so intensively in Wittgenstein's texts?
Given the generality of the paradigm: that it is a particularly
apposite example but not itself a definiens, it allows us to see
beyond the ostensive definition provided by the sample, to the
broader way in which this might act as a model for further
applications, e.g. of the meaning of a word. It is the very ambiguity
of the duck-rabbit that perspicuously illustrates aspect-blindness
(PI-II p.194). In addition, graphics can be made to misrepresent a
concept, e.g. Wittgenstein draws a broken square which nearly
describes something, or blurs the boundaries (BBB p.164), and he
also shows the incremental transformation of a square into a
triangle (LW 1 §71 ∆1455-58). In these examples we have our
attention drawn to the point at which the integrity of a concept with
apparently clear boundaries breaks down:
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Conclusions
My main conclusion is to criticise Baker & Hacker's remarks on the
function of the graphics. If (p.5):
inferring or drawing a conclusion is not a mental process or act, but a
transformation of expressions according to paradigms. It is not
answerable to something external but is a movement within
grammar.
then I disagree with their description of the passive [illustrative]
role of the graphics:
[Wittgenstein's] points are illustrated with very elementary
examples, e.g. 25x25=625, or simple diagrammatic proofs of
equations.
I propose that they are not serving [passively] as illustrations, but
[actively] as the bedrock, i.e. they function normatively. The
generality of the paradigm over the particular sample reinforces this
normative function. Baker & Hacker go on to assert that (p.6):
we construe mathematical proofs as demonstrations of propositions
from other propositions, but this too is unessential since a proof may
consist of a diagram or geometrical construction to which the
concepts of premises, conclusions and inference are inapplicable.
I think this is also wrong, except to the extent that we might say
these words have a function only in relation to mathematics and
number concepts. In the interpretation of a diagram one needs
equivalent constructs. We can find in the straightness of the line, in
the use of a ruler and a compass, that we have a grammar of
diagrammatic construction. "A proof established internal relations"
(Baker & Hacker p.8), but these can only be represented graphically
by the use of certain drawing techniques and the use of instruments
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which themselves represent a move in [geometrical] grammar. We
thereby demonstrate what we accept as correct inferences.
There is a core to Wittgenstein's project to show us our central
normative concepts, not only in mathematics but in language use in
general. What is normative is bound up with our form of
representation (Ambrose p.16). The discretionary nature of this form
of representation extends even to mathematics, where what we take
as discovery through calculation is normative description (RFM-VII
§6). Finally, we encounter linguistic normativity, for example when
we feel the "hardness of the logical must" (PI-I §437, Baker & Hacker
p.269). To this list of forms of representation which are linked by
compatible norms I propose to add some graphical paradigms. The
ones cited are not the only cases, c.f. RFM-I §22-69, PG-IV §18, etc.
Recapitulation
Graphics are normative in that they establish the underlying
grammatical structure of concepts such as proof. They do not
merely illustrate such concepts. It is the rules of graphical
combination that make perspicuous what is normative within
language. The paradigmatic function of graphics is related to
Wittgenstein's interest in the important role of generality and
prototype (ungefähr and Urbild) in conceptualisation.
This reinforces the importance of the correct representation of
Wittgenstein's graphics, all of which are under revision at present.
Graphics are able to show us the fine incremental slippage between
what we would accept and what we would not. The boundaries are
loose, with graphics functioning as paradigms rather than samples.
They contribute to the therapeutic function of philosophy. The
moment at which words acquire fixed boundaries is the moment at
which "language goes on holiday" (PI-I §38).
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in I and II the number that one immediately recognizes; in III the
criterion of correlation; in IV we have to count both groups; in V we
recognize the same pattern. (PG p.354 ∆1258)
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in the system α is it possible to trisect a line? What kind of trisection is
meant in this question… trisection by trial and error and measurement?
In that case the answer is perhaps yes.
(PG-II §27 ∆1261)
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the picture of a black and white patch serve us simultaneously as a
paradigm of what we understand by "lighter" and "darker" and as a
paradigm for "white" and "black". (RFM-I §105 ∆1055)
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(RFM-I §67 ∆1049)
 MS 122 p.28r
RFM-I §70 (∆1050)
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Philosophical Remarks p.278 ∆1121
To what extent can you say that grey is a mixture of black and white
in the same sense as orange is a mixture of red and yellow? And
doesn't lie between black and white in the sense in which red lies
between blue-red and orange? If we represent the colours by means
of a double-cone, instead of an octahedron, there is only one between
on the colour-circle, and red appears on it between blue-red and
orange in the same sense as that in which blue-red lies between blue
and red. And if in fact that is all there is to be said, then a
representation by means of a double-cone is adequate, or at least one
using a double eight-sided pyramid is.
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BBB p.164 & LW 1 §71 ∆1455-58
